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Abstract 
The mechanisms underlying mnemic neglect (MN) and the conditions under which it waxes and 
wanes are not yet fully understood.  The research in this article examined conditions during both 
encoding and recall that could potentially moderate the MN effect and that could provide cues 
about the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the effect.  Results showed that MN: (a) 
emerged after recall was delayed (Study 1); (b) could not be attributed to differential behavior 
looking time (Study 2); and (c) did not emerge under cognitive load (Study 3); and (d) was not 
linked to the perceived extremity, importance or evaluations of the behaviors.  However, how 
informative the behaviors were perceived for personality may contribute to the effect (Study 4).  
Finally, results from Study 3 and Study 4 showed that when participants were cognitively 
occupied during encoding, the MN effect waned.  Implications of these collective findings for 
the MN phenomenon were discussed. 
 
Keywords: mnemic neglect, loss of mnemic neglect, self-protection, self-enhancement, self-
memory
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The Waxing and Waning of Mnemic Neglect 
One of the keys to happiness is a bad memory — Rita Mae Brown 
Most people have a positive self-concept.  Some cognitive processing mechanisms, such 
as preferential processing of information that is consistent with the positive self, will act to 
maintain this positive view of the self.  However, it is also thought that an individual is 
motivated to maintain a positive self.  Indeed, it is often proposed that people are motivated to 
both enhance the self and to defend the self, and that these motivations tend to be relatively 
powerful and pervasive (for an overview of self motivations, see Sedikides & Strube, 1997).  
One way in which this motivation to enhance and protect the self may manifest is in selective 
memory.  Self enhancement motivation and self-protection motivation may work to bias self-
memory to promote self-enhancing memories and to eliminate self-threatening memories (for 
example, see Skowronski, 2011).   
The memory implications of motivated self-protection have been explored in a series of 
laboratory studies (see Sedikides & Green, 2000) that have documented mnemic neglect (MN):  
The tendency for a person to selectively forget newly-encountered information that threatens 
their positive self-concept.  In such studies people read a series of behaviors.  The behaviors: (a) 
are said to describe either the experimental participant or a fictional person named Chris; (b) are 
either positive or negative, and (c) each either imply a trait that is relatively important to the 
participant’s self-concept (e.g., “would borrow other people’s belongings without their 
knowledge,” which implies untrustworthiness) or imply a trait that is not especially important to 
the participants’ self-concept (e.g., “would constantly talk about how much stuff there is to be 
done,” which implies complaining).  Often, the behaviors are portrayed as feedback (e.g., you 
THE WAXING AND WANING OF MNEMIC NEGLECT                                                                    4 
 
 
 
took a personality test, and based on the results, these are behaviors that the test predicts you 
could do; Chris took a personality test, and based on the results, these are behaviors the test 
predicts that Chris could do).  Later, in a free recall task, participants try to recall the behaviors.  
The recall data typically show that a participant exhibits relatively poor recall for negative 
behaviors that imply traits important to their self-concept, but only when these behaviors are 
depicted as those that could be performed by the participant, not when the behaviors are 
portrayed as those that could be performed by Chris.  This selectivity in recall is mnemic neglect. 
Explaining the Mnemic Neglect Effect 
In considering the phenomenon of MN, Sedikides and Green (2000) suggested that an 
individual is motivated to maintain a positive self-concept.  As a result, individuals strategically 
neglect information that strongly threatens their self-concepts.   
The word “neglect” implicates processing:  One key assumption underlying the standard 
explanation for MN is that people process threatening behaviors shallowly (Brown & Craik, 
2000; Craik, 2002).  For example, Sedikides, Green, and Pinter (2004) suggested that when the 
behaviors threaten central aspects of an individual’s self-concept (as compared to behaviors that 
threaten peripheral aspects of an individual’s self-concept), the individual will prematurely stop 
processing this information.  Thus, because of this shallow processing, these self-threatening 
behaviors are at a disadvantage when it comes to recall.   
A second assumption thought to underlie MN is that this shallow processing works in a 
specific manner:  It does not allow the new information to be linked to other self-relevant 
information in memory, such as a person’s memory of their past behaviors (see Pinter, Green, 
Sedikides, & Gregg, 2011).  The presence of such links are thought to be crucial to the ability to 
remember information in a free recall task.  Ultimately, then, poor memory for newly 
THE WAXING AND WANING OF MNEMIC NEGLECT                                                                    5 
 
 
 
encountered self-threatening information (mnemic neglect) is thought to occur because, as a 
result of shallow processing, in a search of memory that occurs during the free recall task there 
are relatively few routes that lead to the self-threatening behaviors.    
Empirical Evidence for the Motivated Processing Model 
The MN processing model has been supported by several sets of results.  One set of 
studies compared two kinds of memory for self-threatening information (Green, Sedikides, & 
Gregg, 2008):  free recall performance versus recognition performance.  Results from these 
studies show that MN occurs in free recall performance, but not in recognition memory 
performance.  Recognition memory performance does not depend on links among items in 
memory, as does free recall performance.  Hence, these results support the idea that MN occurs 
because self-threatening information is poorly integrated into the memory system, and not 
because the information was: (a) never stored to begin with (e.g., because of total inattention), or 
(b) that the information may have been stored in memory, but the memory trace for the event is 
gone. 
The standard MN processing model has also been supported by findings contrasting 
memory results obtained in typical processing conditions with results obtained in restricted-time 
processing conditions (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 3).  When participants have limited 
time to process each behavior description, the MN effect in free recall dissipates.  In theory, this 
loss of MN (a term introduced by Zengel, Skowronski, Valentiner, & Sedikides, 2015) occurred 
because the limited processing time caused all behaviors to receive shallow processing, thus 
eliminating the selective processing mechanism thought to produce MN.  
A third set of studies (Pinter, et al., 2011) focused on how MN is related to the extent to 
which self-threatening information is linked to an individual’s existing self-concept.  Separation-
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driven thought is theorized to spontaneously occur when new information threatens an 
individual’s self-concept.  Pinter et.al. directly tested this idea.  When participants were 
explicitly instructed to separate self-threatening information from the self, the usual MN effect 
emerged.  However, loss of MN emerged when participants were directly instructed to integrate 
self-threatening information into their self-concepts.  Data also showed that there was an 
impairment in free recall for self-enhancing behaviors when people were specifically asked to 
separate those behaviors from the self-concept.  These multiple results appeared only in a free 
recall task, not in a recognition task.  Collectively, then, the Pinter et al. results supported the 
idea that free recall for newly encountered information is affected by whether people think about 
the information in a way that integrates it into, or separates it from, the self-concept.  Poor free 
recall occurs when information is not well-integrated into the memory system, as is thought to 
spontaneously occur with self-threatening information.   
The Goals of Our Studies 
In the present article we report results from a number of new MN studies. These studies 
simultaneously pursued four goals.  The first follows from the results of studies that show that 
the emergence of MN is sensitive to conditions (broadly construed, including memory tasks, 
instructions, processing opportunities, individual differences, and stimuli).  For example, a loss 
of MN is observed when: (a) behaviors are seen as reflecting malleable traits instead of fixed 
traits (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2005), (b) negative behaviors are not seen as diagnostic of 
self-relevant negative traits (Green & Sedikides, 2004), and (c) a self-improvement motive is 
subtly activated (Green, Sedikides, Pinter, & Van Tongeren, 2009).  MN is also lost for 
participants exhibiting anxiety, dysphoria, and schizotypy, and who exhibit a repressive coping 
style (Saunders, 2011, 2012; Saunders, Vallath, & Reed, 2015; Saunders, Worth, & Fernandes, 
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2012; Zengel et al., 2015).  Moreover, MN is absent in tests of recognition memory, and the 
emergence of MN in free recall is sensitive to the manner in which the behaviors are recorded in 
the free recall task (Newman, Sapolsky, Tang, & Bakina, 2014).  Following from these MN 
moderation studies, one goal of the present studies is to expand on the corpus of knowledge that 
details when MN occurs, and when it does not.  
Some of the conditions that moderate the emergence of mnemic neglect are relevant to 
our second goal:  To better understand some of the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to MN.  
As in the Sedikides and Green (2000) and Green et al. (2008) free recall vs. recognition studies, 
mechanisms can sometimes be implied by the circumstances under which MN is observed (free 
recall) and in which it is lost (recognition).  In other cases, as in Pinter et al. (2011), mechanism 
information can come directly from studies in which participants are asked to process the 
stimulus behaviors in different ways (inclusion in the self vs. exclusion from the self), or by 
approaches such as measuring aspects of the ways in which the stimulus behaviors are processed 
(e.g., assessing reading time).  However, despite the progress that has been made so far, there is 
much to learn about cognitive mechanisms that contribute to MN.  One candidate mechanism 
locates the cause early in processing:  As implicated by the perceptual defense idea (e.g., Erdelyi, 
1974), people may simply not attend to information that threatens the self.  Hence, the memory 
trace for that information may be weak or absent, which can produce poor recall.  A second 
candidate is reflected in the “standard” explanation for mnemic neglect, which suggests that its 
emergence reflects a causal chain:  Lack of elaboration during behavior encoding causes few 
links to be formed to the memory of a self-threatening behavior, which makes such behaviors 
hard to find during the memory search that occurs during a free recall task.  The studies that we 
report in this article attempt to provide evidence that can help to resolve this theoretical debate. 
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The third goal of the studies described in this article is to explore the scientific credibility 
of the MN effect.  Elements of science, including psychology, have recently been criticized for 
the supposed inability to replicate some of its phenomena (e.g., Schooler, 2014).  Indeed, the 
scientific status of a phenomenon is enhanced when it is replicated: (a) often, (b) by different 
research teams, and (c) using multiple methods.  Our perception is that the phenomenon of MN 
could use bolstering in these areas.  There are relatively few empirical papers that explore the 
phenomenon of MN (a Psychinfo search conducted on Dec. 6, 2017 yielded only 22 publications 
in response to a search using the term “Mnemic Neglect”), and many of those papers have been 
produced by the Sedikides and Green research team (for a review, see Sedikides, Green, 
Saunders, Skowronski, & Zengel, 2016).  Only a handful have been produced by other scholars 
(for recent and representative publications, see Jones & Brunell, 2014; Newman, Eccleston, & 
Oikawa, 2017; Newman, Nibert, & Winer, 2009; Saunders, et al., 2015).  Thus, in the present 
article we sought to explore the scientific status of the MN construct by assessing its 
replicability, by documenting the conditions that influence its replicability, and by doing so in a 
context that is independent of the Sedikides and Green laboratories.1  
 The fourth goal underlying the studies that we report in the present manuscript is to shed 
light on the general issue of how the self influences memory, both a major and long-standing 
interest across many areas of psychology (e.g., see Klein, 2012).  For example, some have 
wondered whether bias can simply be induced by an item’s valence, asking whether people 
generally have better memory for the good in their lives or for the bad in their lives (see 
Skowronski, 2011).  Others have wondered whether there is a self-consistency bias, asking 
whether people better remember those things that fit their self-conceptions or those that diverge 
from their self-conceptions (e.g., Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996).  The studies 
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that we describe in this article can speak to these issues.  However, the MN paradigm provides a 
relatively unique approach to research in these areas.  Because much of the existing research in 
these areas uses real-world memories, it is characterized by potential confounds between the 
characteristics of stimuli and the content of stimuli.  These confounds may account for why 
research results exploring these questions often yield inconsistent results.  The advantage of 
using the MN paradigm to address these questions is that it can bypass these potential confounds:  
Critical comparisons in the MN paradigm involve memory for the exact same behaviors as they 
describe the self or as they describe the fictional Chris. 
Moreover, enhanced understanding of the causes of these kinds of memory biases that 
might be provided by MN studies has considerable practical importance.  That is, it has often 
been suggested that people can only function optimally when they maintain a positive life 
outlook, and the maintenance of such an outlook is thought to be helped by the minimization of 
negative memories (e.g., Skowronski, 2011).  Indeed, health psychology and clinical psychology 
are rife with examples of individuals whose functioning is impaired by negative memories, as in 
the case of PTSD (e.g., Schnurr & Jankowski, 1999).   Hence, MN research in general, which 
include the studies described in the present article, can provide critical experimental evidence 
about the causes of those self-related memory biases that can affect the extent to which an 
individual can maintain functionality in the real world.  
Study 1 
An initial study used a version of the MN paradigm developed by Sedikides and Green 
(2000).  In this version of the paradigm participants read behaviors and are asked to consider 
them to be real.  Some participants are asked to consider themselves as the enactor of the 
behaviors, but others are told that a fictional person named Chris is the enactor.  Later, behavior 
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memory is assessed via both a free recall task and a recognition task (see Green, et al., 2008).  
Pretesting conducted by Sedikides and Green (2000) showed that some of the negative behaviors 
that participants read (untrustworthy behaviors, unkind behaviors) are especially threatening to 
participant self-conceptions.  If past free recall results are reproduced by our study, these should 
evince MN, which should not emerge in the recognition data.   
However, MN studies generally assess memory after only a short delay.  In one set of 
conditions, we followed this procedure, asking participants to engage in a free recall task after 
only a 2.5 min filled delay.  However, a second group of participants waited a full 48 hr before 
returning to the study to complete the memory tasks.  This manipulation obviously was intended 
to assess the temporal durability of the MN effect.  The 48 hr delay was selected because 
forgetting curve data (e.g., Loftus, 1985) suggests both that recall rates should decrease relative 
to the 2.5 min condition, but that there is some chance that a reasonable level of post-delay recall 
would remain.  Hence, in our view a plausible outcome after a 48 hr delay was that memory for 
all behaviors would decline, but that the MN effect would remain:  Recall rates for important 
negative behaviors would still be higher when the behaviors described Chris then when the 
behaviors described the self.   
However, it is also the case that MN might dissipate entirely after a 48 hr delay.  This 
might occur if memory for the all behaviors dissipates rapidly with the passage of time, thus 
eliminating the MN effect.  This rapid memory loss might occur if the mnemic neglect paradigm 
produces very weak memories: Weak memories are quickly forgotten (Loftus, 1985).  More 
intriguing than this general memory loss idea is the possibility that immediate memory for 
important negative self-descriptive behaviors is temporarily suppressed by the arousal prompted 
by encountering such behaviors (see Roozendaal, 2002).  The passage of time ought to eliminate 
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this arousal-prompted forgetting, so that with the passage of time recall for important negative 
self-descriptive behaviors might rebound to match the levels exhibited by those same important 
negative behaviors that describe Chris.  The emergence of this latter effect would thus suggest 
that current thinking about the processes that produce mnemic neglect is not correct. 
Participants and Design 
Workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk2 (MTurk) were recruited (N = 150).  This 
sample size was determined via a power analysis3.  Each was compensated with US $2.00.  
Recruited workers were restricted to those who lived in the United States and who demonstrated 
high worker quality (at least a 95% approval rating on previously submitted work).  This targeted 
recruitment was used for all studies in this manuscript using MTurk.  On agreeing to participate, 
workers were routed to Survey Monkey (http://www.surveymonkey.com), which presented all 
stimuli and recorded all responses.  Using a splash page, participants were routed via a random 
assignment scheme to web pages that began the protocols for each of the four between-
participants conditions (Chris / delay; Chris / no delay; self / delay; self / no delay).  Data from 
four participants were omitted from all analyses because they simply skipped through the 
experiment and failed to answer any questions.   
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure was adapted from prior research (e.g., Green, et al., 2005) and consisted of 
an encoding phase, a distracter task, the free recall task, and the recognition task.  The task order 
was constant across all participants. 
Encoding phase.  Participants viewed at their own pace 32 behavioral statements.  The 
back-button was disabled to prevent participants from returning to previous behaviors once they 
had read them and moved on to the next behavior statement.  These behavior statements were 
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identical to those used by Sedikides and Green (2000).  Half of the behaviors that participants 
encountered were negative, and half were positive.  Furthermore, half of the behaviors pertained 
to trait dimensions that are generally central to peoples’ self-conceptions (trustworthiness, 
kindness), and the other half of the behaviors pertained to trait dimensions that are generally 
peripheral to peoples’ self-conceptions (modesty, uncomplaining).  Studies examining MN have 
used these behaviors and trait dimensions extensively (e.g., Green, et al., 2005; Green & 
Sedikides, 2004; Green, et al., 2008; Newman, et al., 2009). 
Participants (a) were told that the behaviors were to be thought of as coming from 
someone who knew the referent (self or Chris) well, and (b) were asked to consider the behaviors 
as real.  For each participant, these behaviors were presented in a unique random order that was 
determined by the web pages.  For half of the participants, these behaviors were said to directly 
pertain to each participant (i.e. the referent was the self).  For the other half of participants, these 
behaviors were said to pertain to someone (not the participant) named Chris (i.e. the referent was 
Chris).   
Distracter task.  Participants were given two-and-a-half minutes to list as many of the 
United States as they could think of.  
Delay condition procedures and instructions.  Participants in a no delay condition 
completed, immediately following the distracter task, a behavior recall task followed by a 
behavior recognition task.   
In the delayed recall condition, after immediately completing the distracter task, 
participants were informed that in 48 hours they would complete the second part of the 
experiment.  They were given a Survey Monkey website link that became activated 48 hours 
after finishing the distracter task.  To minimize attrition and to prompt task completion, 
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participants in this condition received a reminder via e-mail.  Despite the reminder, 34 people in 
the 48-hr delay condition who completed the first study phase did not attempt the second study 
phase, so they provided no data for the experiment.  Moreover, eight participants in the 48-hr 
delay condition failed to complete either the behavior recall task or the behavior recognition task, 
so whatever data they did provide were excluded from analyses.  Participants in the 48-hr delay 
condition who finished the protocol completed the same free recall task and behavior recognition 
task that were completed by participants in the no delay condition. 
Behavior recall task.  Participants were asked to list as many behaviors as they could 
remember, without worrying about verbatim reporting, for five minutes.  They were provided 
with 32 lines on one computer screen to provide their reports. 
Behavior recognition task.  When participants finished the behavior recall task, they 
engaged in a behavior recognition task.  The behavior recognition task had two purposes.  The 
first is concerned with specifying conditions under which MN may occur and conditions in 
which it may be lost.  Past research results show that MN is lost on an immediate recognition 
task, but we thought that it was possible that MN might appear on the delayed recognition task.  
This possibility was considered because in prior MN studies, immediate recognition memory for 
all behaviors was quite good.  We speculated that some degree of impairment of recognition 
memory might be necessary for MN to emerge in the recognition memory task.  Because 
recognition memory should degrade with delay, the inclusion of a delayed recognition task 
assessed this possibility.  Second, to our knowledge, only two sets of experiments have examined 
whether MN emerges in recognition tasks (Green et al., 2008; Pinter et al., 2011).  Hence, in our 
view, replication is warranted. 
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In the recognition task participants were shown 64 behaviors.  The ordering of behaviors 
was randomly determined for each participant by the web pages.  Half of these behaviors were 
identical to the behaviors presented during the encoding phase; the rest were lures that implied 
the same traits as those implied by the actual encoding task behaviors, but that were never read 
during the encoding phase.  These lures were taken from Green et al. (2008), and were designed 
to closely parallel the original behaviors.  During the recognition test, participants were asked to 
indicate whether behaviors were “old” (i.e., behaviors were previously read during the encoding 
phase) or “new” (i.e., behaviors were never read during the encoding phase).  
Results 
The experiment was conducted as a 2 (Recall Delay: 2.5 min vs. 48 hr) × 2 (Behavior 
Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive 
vs. negative) mixed-model factorial design.  The first two variables were between-subjects and 
the last two were within-subjects.  This design was used in separate analyses of the free recall 
data and of the recognition data.  To save space, our discussion of results focuses on those effects 
yielded by the analyses that are crucial to the manuscript’s goals.  A full presentation of results 
from all analyses is available from this article’s first author. 
Free recall data.  Free recall items recorded for each participant who finished the 
experimental protocol were screened.  In many mnemic neglect studies two raters have been 
used to determine if the gist of the recalled behavior matches the originally presented behavior. 
However, agreement rates have been high (typically over 90%) and most of the disagreements 
were regarding intrusions or corrections that involved accidentally assigning the wrong code to a 
behavior. Our studies have therefore relied only on one coder who was careful to avoid these 
problems.   
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Following the procedure of Sedikides and Green (2000), intrusions were removed from 
the data prior to analyses.  Intrusions included the following: (a) recalling a behavior that was not 
presented, (b) writing the same behavior twice, and (c) changing the valence of a recalled 
behavior.  Intrusions represented approximately thirteen percent of the recalled items.  This 
percentage exceeds that usually observed in MN studies (roughly five percent; J. Green, personal 
communication, January 28, 2011).  One might guess that the intrusion rate was a consequence 
of the internet-based sample and method used in Study 1.  Sedikides and Green (2000) dropped 
from analyses data from participants whose recall protocol exhibited three or more intrusions.  
We did the same:  Eight participants were excluded from analyses for this reason.  Additionally, 
data from one participant in the no delay condition was excluded from analyses because that 
participant reported that he/she could not recall a single behavior (though analyses yielded 
similar results regardless of whether or not this participant was retained).  These same exclusion 
criteria are used throughout the studies reported in this paper.   
Following all participant deletions, the number of participants in each between-
participants cell of the study was as follows:  Chris/delay = 17, Chris/no delay = 34, self/delay = 
12, self/no delay = 32.  Due to attrition and the greater tendency to not recall any behaviors after 
a 48-hr delay, the sample size was relatively small.  However, the goal of 60 participants derived 
from our power analysis was met.  We also considered the possibility that participants had a 
legitimate reason not to recall any behaviors after the 48-hr delay (weak original memories).  
Thus, we conducted an alternative analysis that included the 34 participants who recalled no 
behaviors in the delay condition.  Inclusion of these participants did not alter the MN-relevant 
pattern of results.  Note that in the section below we report the data with the no-recall 
participants excluded.  This was done to maintain consistency in the exclusion rules used in 
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Experiment 1 and in the other studies reported in this manuscript (which did not use the delay 
manipulation).   
Following the procedures outlined by Sedikides and Green (2000), free recall data were 
scored using a general meaning (gist) criterion.  The proportion of trials on which a behavior was 
scored as correctly recalled using this criterion was separately calculated for each participant for 
each cell of the Trait Type (central vs. peripheral) × Behavior Valence (positive vs. negative) 
within-subject matrix.  For analysis, these proportions were entered into a Recall Delay × 
Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence mixed model ANOVA.   
The MN effect emerged.  Sedikides and Green (2000) noted that one indication of MN 
lies in the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction.  Our ANOVA yielded 
this exact interaction, F(1, 91) = 4.59, p = .035, ηp2 = .048.  The means for this interaction (see 
Table 1) evince MN:  Compared to the recall rate for central/negative behaviors that described 
Chris, recall rates for central/negative behaviors that described the self were low [t(93) =  -2.58, 
p = .012, ηp2 = .067].  Moreover, this effect was evident both at immediate recall and at delayed 
recall (non-significant Delay × Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence 
interaction, F(1, 91) = 0.32, p = .576, ηp2 = .003).   Thus, MN is not an ephemeral phenomenon, 
but is evident in long-term memory.  
The fact that delay did not moderate the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence interaction was not a consequence of an ineffective delay manipulation.  The ANOVA 
yielded a significant Delay × Trait Type interaction, F(1, 91) = 8.68, p = .004, ηp2 = .087, as well 
as a main effect for Delay, F(1, 91) = 18.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .172.   As is evident from Table 1, 
the means for the interaction show that for peripheral behaviors, more behaviors were recalled in 
the no delay condition (M = .16, SD = .15) than in the delay condition (M = .07, SD = .10), 
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F(1, 93) = 7.60, p = .007, ηp2 = .076.  This pattern was especially pronounced for central 
behaviors (no delay M = .35 SD =.18; delay M = .17, SD = .11), F(1, 93) = 23.00, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .198. 
Behavior recognition data.  Following the procedures outlined by Green et al. (2008), 
recognition data were analyzed using signal detection theory (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Swets, 1996).  For old-new recognition tests, four types of answers 
are possible: An old behavior can be correctly identified as old (a hit); a new behavior can be 
correctly identified as new (a correct rejection); an old item can be mistakenly classified as new 
(a miss); and a new item can be mistakenly classified as old (a false alarm).  Conceptually, 
recognition accuracy (δ) refers to the extent to which one can both correctly identify old 
behaviors as old and correctly identify new behaviors as new.  
In Study 1 accuracy rates were derived by converting mean hits and mean correct 
rejections into proportions, and then averaging the result.  These δ values were separately 
calculated for each participant for each cell of the Trait Type (central vs. peripheral) × Behavior 
Valence (positive vs. negative) within-subject matrix.  The values were entered into a mixed-
model ANOVA that included these variables, as well as the between-subjects variables of 
behavior referent (self vs. Chris) and recall delay (2.5 min, 48 hr). 
No MN in behavior recognition.  Of main importance in the analysis is whether evidence 
of MN emerged in the recognition data.  It did not (see Table 2).  The Behavior Referent ×Trait 
Type × Behavior Valence interaction that is thought to be one indicator of MN was not 
significant, F(1, 91) = .00, p = .995 ηp2 < .001.  We also considered the possibility that MN in 
recognition might occur only after a delay. As reflected in the nonsignificant Delay × Behavior 
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Referent ×Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction, F(1, 91) = .11, p = .747, ηp2 = .001, the 
data did not support this possibility.   
The absence of MN in the recognition data cannot be explained by the idea that the 
manipulations were ineffectual.  For example, replicating previous research, central behaviors 
were better recognized than peripheral behaviors, F(1, 91) = 9.66, p = .003, ηp2 = .096.  
Moreover, there was a main effect for delay, F(1, 91) = 8.92, p = .004, ηp2 = .089, and a marginal 
Delay × Behavior Referent × Behavior Valence interaction, F(1, 91) = 3.47, p = .066, ηp2 = .037.  
The means for this interaction do not inform MN, simply suggesting that the effect of delay on 
recognition accuracy was especially large for negative behaviors that described Chris.   
Discussion 
Study 1 replicated prior MN results, showing that it occurs in a free recall task, but not in 
a behavior recognition task.  It extended these prior results by showing: (a) that MN emerges in 
free recall after a 48 hr delay between exposure to the behaviors and engagement in the free 
recall memory task; (b) that the loss of MN in recognition occurs after a 48 hr delay between 
exposure to the behaviors and engagement in the recognition task, and (c) the effects described in 
(a) and (b) emerge from a sample of Survey Monkey workers who completed the tasks in a non-
laboratory setting (most previous studies explored university students in laboratory settings).   
However, one possible limitation of our findings was that the recognition task was 
administered after the recall task.  It should be noted that this procedure was used because it 
duplicated the procedure of Green et al. (2008), and our main focus was on the recall measure.  
We therefore did not alter the sequence of when the recognition assessment occurs.  However, 
the use of this fixed task ordering does raise the possibility that performance on the recognition 
task was affected by prior performance of the free recall task.  Hence, it is possible that if the 
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recognition task were to be administered by itself, a MN effect might emerge with the 
recognition assessment.  Because of the theoretical significance of such a result, future studies 
ought to pursue this possibility.  
Study 2 
The results from Study 1 suggest that MN is not an ephemeral phenomenon, but is 
produced by processes affecting long-term memory.  Study 2 pursued evidence regarding some 
of the plausible processes that might produce such long-lasting effects.   
The standard explanation for MN implicates depth of self-related processing:  
Threatening information is not processed deeply and is not linked to self-knowledge, so it is not 
well-remembered in a free recall task.  However, the exact locus of this shallow processing 
requires additional specificity.  One possibility is that this shallow processing could reflect a 
relative lack of attention to threatening stimuli might be differential attention.  As in the idea of 
“perceptual defense” (e.g., Erdelyi, 1974; also see Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Pool, Brosch, 
Delphanique, & Sander, 2016), when a stimulus is detected as threatening, people may quit 
attending to the stimulus or divert attention to another stimulus.  This implies that people should 
spend relatively little time looking at self-threatening information.  This fits with an early view 
articulated by Sedikides and Green (2000): “central negative information is recalled poorly 
because, at least in part, such information receives the allocation of minimal processing time” (p. 
914).  If this minimal allocation occurred when people initially encountered a behavior, then one 
would expect patterns in behavior reading time to largely mirror patterns in behavior recall.   
A second possible alternative contributor to MN lies in differential encoding ease.  
Because self-important negative information is inconsistent with a person’s usually-positive self-
view, such information may be especially difficult to encode.  This idea comes from the person 
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memory literature, which suggests that reading time is especially long for expectancy-
inconsistent behaviors and that this reading time effect is a plausible mediator of recall (Bargh & 
Thein, 1985; Belmore, 1987; Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984).  This implies that people 
should spend an especially long time processing self-threatening behaviors.  However, it is also 
plausible that this processing time effect might extend to any negative stimuli, not just to self-
important negative stimuli (e.g., Fiske, 1980).  Negative stimuli are generally thought to be 
atypical and unexpected, so such stimuli might be expected to require additional processing 
above and beyond its degree of self-importance.  Hence, if there is a slowdown in processing of 
negative information, it is plausible that it might be observed for all negative behaviors, not just 
for negative behaviors that have implications for central traits. 
Study 2 explored these alternative ideas by using a standard MN paradigm and measuring 
the length of time that participants spent reading the behaviors.   
Participants and Design 
 Students (N = 114) enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Northern Illinois 
University participated.  Compensation was partial credit toward completion of a course research 
option. 
The experiment was conducted as a 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Trait Type: 
central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) mixed factorial design.  The 
first variable in the design was between-subjects and the last two variables were within-subjects. 
The behavior presentation orders were randomly determined for each participant by the DirectRT 
research software (Empirisoft, 2004) used to conduct the experiment. 
Procedure and Materials 
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The procedure and materials duplicated Study 1, except:  (a) only behavior recall, and not 
behavior recognition, was included after the distracter task; (b) the recall delay manipulation was 
not used; (c) the study was conducted in the laboratory using DirectRT software; (d) the time 
spent with each behavior before moving on to the next behavior was measured and recorded by 
the software; and (e) in the recall task participants received a response box to enter the behaviors 
they could recall one at a time, with the response box being cleared after each behavior was 
submitted.  This last change matches recommendations from Newman and colleagues (2014) to 
instruct participants to recall only one behavior at a time without the possibility of going back 
and reading previous entries.  According to the Newman et al. (2014) findings, this instruction, 
when accompanied by a five min recall period, produced typical MN effect.  Newman et al. 
speculated that such procedures bypass output interference that might prevent the emergence of 
MN. 
Results 
Recall data.  Following the data cleaning procedure of Study 1 and Sedikides and Green 
(2000), participants who recalled no valid behaviors or who exhibited more than three intrusions 
were removed from the data set (n = 25).  Thus, the final sample consisted of 89 participants.  
The exclusion of participants did not vary by referent. 
The free recall responses from these participants were coded using a gist criterion 
following the procedures outlined by Sedikides and Green (2000) (the same procedures used in 
Study 1). The proportion of correctly recalled behaviors was separately calculated for each 
participant for each cell of the Trait Type (central behaviors vs. peripheral behaviors) × Behavior 
Valence (positive behaviors vs. negative behaviors) within-subject matrix.  These proportions 
were entered into a mixed-model ANOVA that reflected the experiment’s factorial design. 
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Replication of the MN effect. Sedikides and Green (2000) noted that one possible 
indicator of MN lies in the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction.  Our 
results evinced this interaction, F(1, 87) = 23.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .212 (see Table 3).  
Decompositions of the interaction confirm the presence of MN.  The Referent × Behavior 
Valence interaction did not emerge for peripheral trait-relevant behaviors, F(1, 87) = 1.46, p = 
.230, ηp2 = .017.  In comparison, the central trait-relevant behaviors evinced a significant 
Behavior Referent × Behavior Valence interaction, F(1, 87) = 31.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .266.  
Furthermore, results of additional decompositions showed that for these central trait-relevant 
behaviors there was not a significant difference in referent-related recall for positive behaviors (p 
= .659).  In comparison, the recall rate of self-referent negative trait-relevant central behaviors 
was significantly lower than the recall rate for Chris-referent negative trait-relevant central 
behaviors, F(1, 87) = 28.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .245.  
The overall ANOVA yielded other significant effects.  These included Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence [F(1, 87) = 16.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .156] and Behavior Referent × Behavior 
Valence [F(1, 87) = 8.33, p = .005, ηp2 = .087] interaction effects, and Behavior Valence 
[F(1, 87) = 15.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .148], Trait Type [F(1, 87) = 120.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .581], and 
Behavior Referent [F(1, 87) = 14.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .144] main effects.  However, 
interpretations of all of these are qualified by the significant three-way interaction, so we forego 
discussion of these effects.     
Behavior reading times.  The mean time4 spent on each behavior during the behavior 
encoding phase was separately calculated for each participant for each cell of the Trait Type 
(central behaviors vs. peripheral behaviors) × Behavior Valence (positive vs. negative) within-
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subject matrix.  These times were entered into a mixed-model ANOVA that reflected the 
experiment’s factorial design. 
Unlike the analysis of behavior recall, analysis of behavior reading times did not evince a 
Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction (p = .607; see Table 4).  To be 
cautious, we also considered that reading time might have an effect regardless of the trait type: 
The distinction between central and peripheral is not always completely clear-cut (Zengel et al., 
2015), and there is reason to believe that reading time effects might emerge for event valence, 
regardless of self-importance (e.g., Fiske, 1980).  However, the Behavior Referent × Behavior 
Valence interaction was also not significant (p = .681). 
Instead, the analysis results evinced a significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence 
interaction, F(1, 87) = 6.90, p = .010, ηp2 = .073.  This interaction was decomposed by looking at 
behavior valence effects within each level of the trait type variable.  For peripheral behaviors, 
reading time did not vary between peripheral positive behaviors and peripheral negative 
behaviors (p = .538).  However, in the case of central behaviors, reading time was longer for 
positive behaviors than for negative behaviors, F(1, 88) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .176.  The 
ANOVA also evinced a significant behavior valence effect [F(1, 87) = 14.27, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .141] that was qualified by the Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect.  No other 
effects were significant. 
Discussion 
As in Study 1, in Study 2, the MN effect in free recall was replicated.  The recall rate of 
self-referent negative trait-relevant central behaviors was significantly lower than the recall rate 
for Chris-referent negative trait-relevant central behaviors.   
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Study 2 also assessed whether this effect could somehow be linked to the time people 
spent looking at the behaviors.  People exhibited short looking times to central trait-relevant 
negative information, but did so equally whether the information described the self or described 
Chris.  Despite this equivalence, the central-trait relevant information that described Chris was 
better recalled than the central trait-relevant information that described the self.  Such results 
make it hard to argue that MN occurs because people avoid looking at self-threatening 
information.   
The looking time data also make it hard to argue that MN occurs because the central trait-
relevant behaviors are especially hard to understand when they implicate the self.  People 
exhibited short looking times to central trait-relevant negative information, but did so equally 
whether the information described the self or described Chris.  This result suggests that negative 
behaviors may have been especially easy to understand, but that this ease of understanding was 
not affected by whether the central trait-relevant behavior was descriptive of the self or Chris.  
However, reading time is not a pure measure, and the sloppiness in the measure may hide 
multiple effects.  Reading time is composed of the time it takes to physically read the behavior 
plus the amount of time it takes to draw upon existing knowledge to understand the behavior.  
These may work in opposing ways.  A couple of examples may illustrate these opposing effects.   
For example, when reading a self/central/positive behavior, a person could spend a 
relatively short amount of time (e.g., 2 s) reading the actual behavior because it is vivid and 
consistent with one’s positive self-image (i.e., the behavior is processed with high fluency).  
Because of this, a relatively long amount of time (e.g., 2 s) could be spent on processing the 
behavior, linking it to both semantic knowledge and episodic memories.  However, when reading 
a self/central/negative behavior, a person could spend a relatively long amount of time (e.g., 3 s) 
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reading the actual behavior because it is inconsistent with one’s positive self-image (i.e., the 
behavior exhibits low fluency).  Because of self-protection concerns, a relatively short amount of 
time (e.g., 1 s) could be spent on processing the behavior and on linking it to semantic 
knowledge and episodic knowledge.  Hence, reading time as measured in Study 2 could be 
identical for both self-affirming behaviors and self-threatening behaviors (e.g., 4 s), but the 
actual amount of processing time allocated to drawing on self-knowledge could vary across the 
behaviors (e.g., 2 s versus 1 s). 
Despite these qualifications, the data from Study 2 are clear:  In the standard MN 
paradigm, MN is not directly linked to reading time.  This result suggests (though does not 
conclusively demonstrate) that MN is not the consequence of differential attention to behaviors, 
nor is it a consequence of the difficulty of encoding behaviors. 
Study 3 
 The explanation left standing after Study 2 is the “standard” MN explanation suggesting 
that MN is caused by the shallow processing accorded to important negative self-relevant events.  
One implication of this idea is that if one causes a participant to shallowly process all the 
behaviors received in the MN paradigm, loss of MN will emerge.   
 This idea was pursued in Study 3 via a cognitive load manipulation.  Some participants 
completed the MN paradigm in the standard conditions.  Others were given a secondary task to 
complete while trying to process the behaviors.  The cognitive load induced by the secondary 
task should work to produce shallow processing of all behaviors.  Accordingly, a loss of MN 
should be observed in the cognitive load condition.     
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Participants and Design 
Students (N = 94) enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Northern Illinois 
University participated.  Compensation was partial credit toward completion of a course research 
option. 
The experiment was conducted as a 2 (Cognitive Load: no cognitive load vs. cognitive 
load) × 2 (Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Trait Type: central behaviors vs. peripheral behaviors) × 
2 (Behavior Valence: positive behaviors vs. negative behaviors) mixed-model factorial design.  
The first two factors in the design were between-subjects; the latter two were within-subjects. 
Procedure and Materials 
With one exception, the materials and procedures used in this study duplicated those of 
Study 2.  The exception was the inclusion of a cognitive load manipulation.  One group of 
participants (randomly assigned) completed exactly the same task completed by participants in 
Study 2.  The second group of participants (also randomly assigned) was given a secondary task 
to complete while they tried to process the behaviors:  They tried to remember a six-digit 
number.  For those in this condition, participants were first shown a computer screen displaying 
a six-digit number.  A different number was used for each behavior encountered.  On each trial 
participants were given five seconds to commit this number to memory.  On a second screen, 
they were shown (for 8 s) a single behavioral statement.  The timing matched the ample 
processing condition in Sedikides and Green (2000, Experiment 3).  On a third screen, 
participants were asked to reproduce the number from the first screen.  Participants were 
instructed to remember the number to the best of their ability, and to reproduce it exactly as it 
appeared on the first screen (see Figure 1).  This cognitive load manipulation has been shown to 
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effectively minimize cognitive capacity and to interfere with stimulus processing (e.g., Wells, 
Skowronski, Crawford, Scherer, & Carlston, 2011).  
Results 
Data recorded for each participant were subjected to a preliminary screening.  Results of 
this screening led to the deletion of several participants from the sample.  One participant was 
excluded from analyses because of a computer failure, seven participants were excluded from 
analyses because they failed to recall any behavior, and four participants were excluded from 
analyses because they recalled trait words as opposed to behaviors.  Lastly, intrusions were 
removed from these data prior to analyses.  Again following the procedures outlined by 
Sedikides and Green (2000), 15 participants were excluded from analyses because they recalled 
three or more intrusions.  Intrusions represented approximately nineteen percent of the recalled 
items.  Overall, data cleaning procedures led to the deletion of 26 participants.  Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 67 participants.  The exclusion of participants did not vary substantially 
between the referent groups or cognitive load groups. 
The recall data were again coded as correct based on a gist criterion. Correct recall 
proportions were then calculated separately for each cell of the within-subjects design.  These 
proportions were the dependent variables in a mixed-model ANOVA that reflected the 
experiment’s factorial design.   
Moderation of the MN Effect.  Of main interest in the study was whether the presence 
of MN in free recall depended on cognitive load.  It did (see Table 5 for behavior recall means 
and standard deviations). 
The ANOVA yielded a number of significant effects (Cognitive Load × Behavior 
Referent × Behavior Valence [F(1, 63) = 5.44, p = .023, ηp2 = .080], Cognitive Load × Behavior 
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Valence [F(1, 63) = 5.44, p = .023, ηp2 = .080], Cognitive Load × Trait Type [F(1, 63) = 8.91, 
p = .004, ηp2 = .124], Trait Type [F(1, 63) = 120.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .656] and Cognitive Load 
[F(1, 63) = 32.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .339]), but we focus on the effect of main theoretical 
importance:  the significant Cognitive Load × Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence interaction, F(1, 63) = 9.36, p = .003, ηp2 = .129.  We thought that the loss of MN under 
cognitive load would be best illustrated by a series of decompositions that parsed this four-way 
interaction.   
The first decomposition explored the data separately by the trait type variable.  When 
peripheral traits were implied by behaviors, the Cognitive Load × Behavior Referent × Behavior 
Valence interaction was not significant (p = .193).  However, this same three-way interaction 
was significant when central traits were implied, F(1, 63) = 10.49, p = .002, ηp2 = .143.  
Decomposition by of this latter significant interaction by the behavior valence variable 
showed that for negative central behaviors the Cognitive Load × Behavior Referent interaction 
was significant, F(1, 63) = 4.94, p = .030, ηp2 = .073.  Further decomposition revealed that while 
self-referent central trait-implying negative behaviors trended towards being recalled less well 
than Chris-referent central negative behaviors in the no load condition, F(1, 34) = 3.11, p = .087, 
ηp
2
 = .084, this was not the case under cognitive load (p = .170).  Thus, while the data in the no 
load condition replicated5 the MN effect, the effect was lost under cognitive load.  In 
comparison, for positive central trait-implicative behaviors the Cognitive Load × Behavior 
Referent interaction approached significance, F(1, 63) = 3.72, p = .058, ηp2 = .056.  However, 
further decomposition indicated that both for the no load condition (p = .244) and for the load 
condition (p = .139) there was not a significant difference between recall of self-referent positive 
central behaviors and Chris-referent positive central behaviors.  
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Discussion 
When the conditions of Study 3 duplicated those in Study 2, MN emerged:  central 
negative behaviors recalled especially poorly when those behaviors were self-referent but not 
Chris-referent.  However, this MN effect was lost when participants tried to encode the behaviors 
under cognitive load.  This was expected from the MN model:  By eliminating the processing 
disadvantage of self-framed central trait-implying negative behaviors, MN should be lost.  That 
is exactly what happened.   
 This result conceptually duplicates results from Sedikides & Green (2000, Experiment 3).  
Their study produced loss of MN by restricting reading time.  However, in both our Study 3 and 
in the Sedikides and Green study, it is possible that the loss of MN may not solely be due to 
behavior processing (formation of linkages to existing information in memory) as specified by 
MN theory.  Poor memory caused by both minimal reading time and by cognitive load might 
simply come from the fact that the behaviors themselves may be incompletely read or 
understood.   
This impaired reading/understanding issue can be bypassed by using manipulations that 
ensure that the behaviors are completely read and understood, but that still interfere with the 
kinds of processing that are thought to enable the behaviors to be linked to other information in 
long-term memory. Experiment 4 pursued this idea by asking participants to make ratings of the 
behaviors as they were encountered.  To make their ratings participants must attend to, read, and 
understand the behaviors.  However, despite attending to and processing the behaviors, the rating 
task may interfere with the processing that is necessary to link the behavior to long-term 
memory.  A similar idea was described by Wyer and Carlston (1979, p. 133).  They suggested 
that manipulations that caused perceivers to focus on the details of behavioral information 
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interfered with the extent to which the behavior was integrated with other behavioral information 
in memory.  Reasoning from the MN model, we thus expected that this interference should 
produce loss of MN by reducing the extent to which all behaviors (not just important negative 
self-relevant behaviors) could be linked to an individual’s existing knowledge. This loss of MN 
should occur despite the fact that the ratings task ensured that individuals read and understood 
the behaviors.   
Study 4  
Participants and Design 
Data for Study 4 were collected in three waves.  In the initial wave of data collection, 
participants who were recruited for the study either read and evaluated (good/bad) each behavior 
(behavior evaluation condition), or read each behavior and rated several of the characteristics of 
each behavior (behavior rating condition).  The behaviors that were read were the same as the 
ones used in Studies 1, 2, and 3.  In response to reviewer feedback, a second wave of data 
collection occurred.  In this second wave, additional subjects engaged in one of the same two 
tasks that were used in the initial wave.  A third (MN replication) condition was used in this 
second wave of data collection.  Participants assigned to this condition completed the standard 
MN paradigm.  Hence, the data from the two waves of data collection looked for the emergence 
of MN in the MN replication condition, and the loss of MN in both the behavior evaluation 
condition and the behavior rating condition.  
In the first wave of data collection a total of 200 participants were recruited through 
MTurk and paid $1.00 (US) for their time.  Eleven additional participants started the study but 
did not complete it and were not paid.  Thus, any data they provided were discarded.  
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Participants were asked to report some demographic information, such as their age.  However, 
ethnicity was not assessed. 
In first wave of data collection, ninety-seven participants were assigned to the behavior 
evaluation condition.  However, three participants either provided ratings without variation 
throughout or they failed to complete the majority of rating items.  Thus, any data they provided 
were discarded. The remaining 97 participants ranged in age between 18 and 65 years (M = 
35.62, SD = 12.57).  Most participants were female (62.9%).   
Additionally, in the first wave of data collection, 96 participants were assigned to the 
behavior rating condition.  Fifteen participants did not answer the demographic questions.  The 
age of the demographic responders ranged from 18 to 65 years (M = 33.51, SD = 11.92), and 
most (55.2%) were female.  
In the second wave of data collection, 450 participants were recruited through MTurk and 
paid $.60 (US) as compensation for their time. Because they either provided no ratings, failed to 
complete the majority of rating items, or said that they encountered technical difficulties as they 
tried to complete the study, 22 of these participants were excluded from the study.  The 
remaining 428 participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 years (M = 38.54, SD = 12.75).  Most 
participants were female (64.9%; with missing data of two participants) and Caucasian (78.1%; 
Black: 6.1%, Asian: 4.9%, Hispanic: 3.5%, mixed ethnicities: 2.8%; American without further 
ethnic distinction: 2.8%; Native American: 0.9%, other: 0.7% with data from four participants 
missing).  Of these 428 participants, 148 were randomly assigned to the behavior evaluation 
condition, 133 were randomly assigned to the behavior rating condition, and 147 were randomly 
assigned to the MN replication condition.    
THE WAXING AND WANING OF MNEMIC NEGLECT                                                                    32 
 
 
 
Thus, when data from both waves of data collection were combined, 245 were in the 
behavior evaluation condition, 233 were in the behavior rating condition, and 147 were in the 
MN replication condition. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants in the MN replication condition completed a version of the mnemic neglect 
paradigm (see Study 1).  However, to make the three conditions of Study 4 as equivalent as 
possible, in this version of the MN paradigm the behavior presentation was not automatically 
paced.  Instead, after 6 s a “next” button became available and could be used to cause a new 
behavior to appear.  This 6 s time seems to hit a “sweet spot” for self-paced processing.  
Feedback from participants who participated in some of the other MN studies that have been 
conducted in our lab indicated that times longer than 6 s were annoyingly long.  More 
importantly, this 6 s minimum is comparable with values used in other studies, and ensures that 
participants in the MN condition would not speed through the display without reading the 
behaviors (see Sedikides & Green, 2000, Study 3).  In the Study 4 procedure, the behaviors were 
displayed with an “X” as placeholder for the referent (prior studies explicitly presented the 
behavior referent).  Participants were instructed, while reading the behaviors, to replace X either 
with their own name (self-referent condition) or with the name “Chris” (Chris-referent condition) 
while reading the behaviors.  In all conditions, after reading (or reading and rating) the 
behaviors, participants encountered the same distractor task and surprise recall task used in Study 
1. 
The behavior rating condition duplicated the methods and instructions used in the MN 
replication condition, but asked participants to provide ratings of the behaviors right after reading 
each.  These ratings employed variations of the types of questions that were used to create and 
THE WAXING AND WANING OF MNEMIC NEGLECT                                                                    33 
 
 
 
select the stimulus material for the mnemic neglect paradigm (Sedikides & Green, 2000).  
Specifically, participants were asked to rate: (a) how negative/positive the behavior is (-3 = 
extremely negative, +3 = extremely positive), (b) how important to personality it is to 
perform/not perform the behavior (-3 = extremely important not to perform; +3 = extremely 
important to perform), and (c) how uninformative/informative the behavior is to personality (- 3 
= extremely uninformative, +3 = extremely informative).  All ratings were performed with all 
scale points labeled using the scheme extremely _____, very ______, slightly _____, neither 
____ nor _____, slightly____, very ____, extremely _____. 
The behavior evaluation condition also duplicated the methods and instructions used in 
the MN replication condition, but asked participants to provide a rating of a behavior right after 
reading each.  This was simply a rating of the extent to which a behavior was good or bad, and 
responses were made on the same kind of 7-point scale described in the prior paragraph.   
Results 
Data cleaning. The responses to the free recall task were again coded using a gist 
criterion.  As with prior mnemic neglect studies, a total of 143 (37 from original data collection 
with behavior ratings; 22 from original data collection with evaluations; 84 from extended data 
collection) participants were excluded from the data analysis because they either did not recall 
any behaviors or their recall contained too many intrusions.  After data exclusion, 191 
participants remained in the behavior evaluation condition, 179 participants remained in the 
behavior rating condition, and 123 participants remained in the MN replication condition.    
In response to a concern about a referent bias in these exclusions, we explored the extent 
to which these exclusions were balanced across the self-referent and Chris-referent conditions.  
Results of a chi-square test, χ2(1) = 4.58, p = .032, indicated that more participants from the self 
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condition (81 excluded vs. 231 not excluded) were excluded for data failings than from the Chris 
condition (61 excluded vs. 262 not excluded).  This result suggests that the memory data 
presented below might be biased by this exclusion imbalance, a possible limitation that ought to 
be kept in mind when considering the implications of Study 4.  However, working against this 
potential bias limitation are results from an additional regression analysis which showed that 
assignment to a referent group did not predict the number of intrusions (p = .848).  Moreover, 
this imbalance was equivalent across the 3 task conditions, so it cannot explain differences in 
recall patterns that might emerge in the MN replication condition and in the two conditions in 
which the behaviors were rated.   
Free recall responses.  Recall proportions were again calculated and entered into a 
mixed model ANOVA (means and standard deviations are listed in Table 6).  We first 
considered whether we could safely combine the data from our two waves of data collection.  
We therefore conducted one 2 (Source: wave 1 vs. wave 2) × 2 (Behavior referent: self vs. Chris) 
× 2 (Trait type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior valence: positive vs. negative) mixed model 
ANOVA on the behavior recall data from the behavior rating condition, with source and 
behavior referent as between subject variable.  We did the same analysis on the data from the 
behavior evaluation condition.  The effect of the source of the data collection would be 
problematic if it affected the Behavior Referent × Tait Type × Behavior Valence interaction 
(behavior rating condition: p = .955; evaluation ratings condition: p = .551) or even the Behavior 
Referent × Behavior Valence interaction (behavior rating condition: p = .702; evaluation ratings 
condition: p = .698).  This was not the case.  Hence, we concluded that the data from the two 
waves of data collection could be safely combined. 
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With this issue resolved, we turned to testing our main hypothesis.  If making ratings 
would inhibit processing in a way that disrupts the mnemic neglect effect, we expected to find a 
4-way interaction effect between condition, behavior referent, trait type and behavior valence.  
This was precisely what we found, F(2, 487) = 3.77, p = .024, ηp2 = .015.  Breaking down the 
interaction showed that the mnemic neglect-indicative three-way interaction between behavior 
referent, trait type, and behavior valence was not significant for the behavior rating condition (p 
= .134) or for the behavior evaluation condition (p = .234) but only for the MN replication 
condition, F(1, 121) = 3.94, p = .049, ηp2 = .032.  Further breakdown in the MN replication 
condition showed the usual pattern for the mnemic neglect effect.  The Behavior Valence × 
Behavior Referent interaction was not significant for peripheral traits (p = .317) and for central 
traits there was no significant difference in recall between self-referent and Chris-referent 
positive central trait-implying behaviors (p = .307).  In contrast, as is expected from the view that 
MN reflects a memory bias that follows from shallow processing, negative central trait-implying 
Chris-referent behaviors (M = .25, SD = .17) were better recalled than negative central trait-
implying behaviors that were self-referent (M = .16, SD = .16), F(1, 121) = 10.20, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.078.   
For completeness, we report (but do not discuss) those effects that were significant (or 
trending), but whose interpretations are qualified by the 4-way interaction:  Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence × Condition [F(2, 487) = 2.57, p = .078, ηp2 = .010], Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence [F(1, 487) = 10.57, p = .001, ηp2 = .021], Behavior Referent × Behavior Referent × 
Condition [F(2, 487) = 2.98, p = .052, ηp2 = .012], Behavior Valence [F(1, 487) = 61.29, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .112], Trait Type [F(1, 487) = 693.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .588], Condition [F(2, 487) = 
2.70, p = .068, ηp2 = .011], and Behavior Referent [F(1, 487) = 6.51, p = .011, ηp2 = .013]. 
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Behavior rating and behavior evaluation responses.  The behavior rating task was 
introduced into the MN paradigm as a way of altering behavior processing.  However, the ratings 
provided during this task may themselves be theoretically informative.  There is an intriguing 
alternative explanation for MN that, to our knowledge, has never been explored.  This 
explanation suggests that MN may be caused by differences in how important negative behaviors 
are perceived to be when they are performed by Chris vs. the self.  For example, consider the 
behavior “kicked the dog.”  People may see that behavior as more negative when performed by 
Chris than when performed by the self.  Stimulus extremity is known to be related to memory.  
Thus, it may be that central negative trait-relevant behaviors may be recalled more poorly for the 
self than for Chris behaviors simply because the perceived extremity of the behaviors differs for 
self and Chris.  While behavior importance has been considered as a potential contributor to MN 
effects (Sedikides & Green, 2000), Chris vs. self differences in other behavior characteristics 
(valence/extremity, informativeness, evaluation) do not seem to have been considered as 
potential contributors to MN.  We did so in a series of additional analyses.  Each of these 
measures was separately entered into a mixed model ANOVA reflecting the experimental design 
that we specified earlier.  Descriptive results for the valence/extremity, informativeness, 
importance, and evaluation ratings all appear in Table 7. The ratings results were clear and 
consistent for the valence/extremity and importance rating variables (a complete walkthrough of 
the results appears in the online material that accompanies this article). The ratings never 
significantly shifted as a function of any analysis effect that contained the behavior referent 
variable (the effect that was closest was the interaction behavior referent and trait type for the 
valence rating, p = .168).  Hence, these perceived behavior characteristics do not seem to be 
likely contributors to MN.   Results with similar implications emerged for the evaluation ratings. 
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The two crucial interactions that might reflect MN (Behavior Referent × Behavior Valence and 
Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence) were not significant (ps > .13).  Significant 
results for these ratings irrelevant to MN, appear in the online material that accompanies the 
article. 
However, the story for the informativeness ratings differs from the story told for the other 
3 ratings.  Interpretation of most significant effects produced by the informativeness analyses 
were qualified by the 3-way interaction described below.  These effects will not be discussed, but 
are presented for completeness.  These included effects for: Trait Type [F(1, 177) = 207.01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .539], Behavior Valence [F(1, 177) = 9.20, p = .003, ηp2 = .049], and Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence [F(1, 177) = 23.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .116]. 
For the informativeness ratings the interaction between trait type, behavior valence and 
behavior referent was significant, F(1, 177) = 5.37, p = .022, ηp2 = .029.  Breaking down the 3-
way interaction first by referent showed that there was a significant Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence interaction when the referent was Chris [F(1, 96) = 4.00, p = .048, ηp2 = .040] and also 
when the referent was the self [F(1, 81) = 19.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .197].  Further breakdown 
showed that no significant results for behavior valence when peripheral traits were implied (ps > 
.15), but significant effects for behavior valence when central traits were implied, both for Chris-
referent behaviors (positive: M = 1.72, SD = 0.77; negative: M = 1.41, SD = 1.29; F(1, 96) = 
5.81, p = .018, ηp2 = .057) and for self-referent behaviors (positive: M = 1.69, SD = 0.70; 
negative: M = 1.18, SD = 1.52; F(1, 81) = 10.92, p = .001, ηp2 = .119).   
The important result here shows that negative behaviors that were relevant to a central 
trait dimension were rated as less informative when they described the self than when they 
described Chris. This pattern maps on to the mnemic neglect effect, suggesting that differential 
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perceived behavior informativeness for Chris and for the self might contribute to MN.  Indeed, 
the result seems to support the notion that MN is linked to the extent to which people integrate or 
separate information from the self.  The idea that the MN effect in memory might be linked to 
the perceived informativeness of a behavior was formally explored in a series of subsidiary 
analyses.  In each analysis (executed on the data from each of the four studies), the perceived 
informativeness ratings obtained from Study 4 were entered into analyses as a predictor of 
performance on the memory task.  This was accomplished in an initial regression analysis in 
which two variables (participants, designated as a categorical variable, and the informativeness 
ratings) predicted recall scores.  This analysis allows examination of the informativeness-
memory relation after extracting between-subjects variance (via the categorized participant 
variable).  Next, for each study the residuals from this analysis were calculated and were used as 
the entries into a 2 (Behavior referent: self, Chris) × 2 (Trait type: central, peripheral) × 2 
(Behavior valence: positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA.  Each ANOVA was examined for 
evidence that the informativeness ratings could statistically account for MN effect in memory.  
Because we were looking for evidence that the informativeness ratings could statistically account 
for MN, we only performed the analysis on those main conditions of each study that essentially 
replicated the MN paradigm.  This included Study 4’s MN replication condition, Study 1’s no 
delay condition, all the data from Study 2, and Study 3’s no cognitive load condition.   
For all four of these data sets, results from the initial regression analysis showed that after 
extracting between-subjects effects, higher informativeness ratings (obtained from Study 4) 
predicted better memory (Study 4: b = .243, t(489) = 11.74, p < .001; Study 1: b = .306, t(261) = 
7.99, p < .001; Study 2: b = .363, t(353) = 13.90, p < .001; Study 3: , b = .385, t(141) = 9.14, p < 
.001.  The residuals from the analysis of each data set from each regression were separately 
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entered into a 2 (Behavior referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Trait type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 
(Behavior valence: positive vs. negative) mixed model ANOVA.  In 3 of these analyses (Study 4, 
Study 1, Study 3), the Behavior Referent × Trait Type ×Behavior Valence interaction that was 
significant in the original analysis of the memory data was not significant in the analysis of the 
residuals, (Study 4 p = .935; Study 1 p = .630; Study 3 p = .569).  These results are congruent 
with the idea that the perceived informativeness of the behaviors may play a role in behavior 
memory.  However, the Behavior Referent × Trait Type ×Behavior Valence interaction that was 
significant in the original analysis of the memory data from Study 2 remained significant in the 
analysis of the residuals, F(1,87) = 4.34, p = .04, ηp2 = .084.   This last result suggests that the 
MN effect reflects processes that are not necessarily linked to the perceived informativeness of 
behaviors. 
The lack of consistency in the results observed across the four studies might reflect the 
possibility that informativeness might merely be a correlate of MN, not necessarily a cause of 
MN.  In any case, our data are the first to highlight a link between the referent of important 
negative behavior and the perceived informativeness of behavior.  Future MN research may want 
to pursue the implications of this link for the emergence of MN.  
Discussion 
The results from Study 4 showed that asking people to deviate from the spontaneous 
 manner in which they thought about the behaviors (by asking them to engage in a behavior 
rating task or behavior evaluation task) produced loss of MN.  This outcome was expected from 
the standard MN processing model:  Equalizing the extent to which all behaviors were processed 
by interfering with the extent to which people linked encountered behaviors to existing 
knowledge should eliminate MN in the free recall of self-referent/central trait-relevant/negative 
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behaviors.  It did.  Moreover, because to provide ratings participants must read and understand 
all behaviors, the results from Study 4 argue against the possibility that loss of MN in the MN 
paradigm occurs because of inattention to, or incomplete understanding of, self-threatening 
behaviors.  People have to read and understand the behaviors to rate them.  Additionally, the 
sample sizes in both rating conditions were substantially larger than the sample size in the MN 
replication condition.  Thus, it is unlikely that a loss of MN in these rating conditions is a 
consequence of a lack of power.  
The collection of the behavior ratings also allowed assessment of the possibility that MN 
was related to changes in how the behaviors were perceived when they reflected the self versus 
when they reflected Chris.  Examination of ratings of the extent to which events were negative or 
positive, were rated as important to personality to perform or not to perform, were evaluated as 
good or bad, did not support this change-in-perception view.  However, this view was supported 
by the judgments of the informativeness of a behavior to personality:  Central negative behaviors 
were seen as less informative to personality when the behaviors were self-descriptive than when 
they described Chris.  Though not consistent across all four studies, results from subsidiary 
analyses suggested that referent-linked view of the informativeness of central negative behaviors 
might influence the MN effect.  This could occur if the perceived characteristics of the behavior 
(informativeness for personality) affected how it is processed.   
One limitation of the interpretation of the behavior ratings task is the way in which we 
phrased “important to personality to perform/not perform”.  As one of the reviewers of an earlier 
version of this article pointed out, the way we tried to rephrase the original items from Sedikides 
and Green (2000) to reflect a referent-independent description might have confused our 
participants.  A review of comments left by participants at the end of the study confirmed that 
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three participants indeed explicitly stated that they had found this particular question confusing.  
While this does not impact the effectiveness of the task on the recall assessment, it does limit the 
In addition, the procedure allows researchers to test more directly the differences between self-perception and 
other-perception, as the authors articulated usefulness of interpreting the responses to the question 
itself.  However, the other two behavior ratings (and the evaluation rating) were not reported as 
confusing. 
Overall Discussion 
Our Studies: Results Overview and Theoretical Implications 
The studies described in the present article pursued several goals.  One goal of the present 
studies was to explore the scientific credibility of MN by repeatedly trying to replicate the 
phenomenon.  A second goal was to explore the descriptive waxing and waning of MN:  to 
expand on the corpus of knowledge that details when MN occurs, and when it does not.  A third 
goal was to gain information about cognitive mechanisms that contribute to MN (or that do not 
contribute to MN).  Of particular interest was helping to more exactly specify what “shallow 
processing” of self-threating negative behaviors entailed:  Ignoring (or inattention to) such 
behaviors or failure to integrate into existing self-knowledge.  A fourth goal was to add to our 
knowledge about the general issue of bias in self-memory.   
We accomplished three of these goals and made progress toward the fourth.  When 
duplicating the procedure pioneered by Sedikides and Green (2000), we found evidence of bias 
in memory in the form of MN.  Negative behaviors were recalled at a low rate when those 
behaviors were self-framed (as opposed to Chris-framed), especially when behaviors implied 
central traits (instead of peripheral traits).  These results emerged: (a) when the free recall task 
immediately followed the behavior presentation; (b) even when there was a 48-hour delay 
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between the behavior presentation and the free recall task; (c) regardless of whether participant 
processing of the behaviors was self-paced or computer-paced (assuming sufficient processing 
time); and (d) when the paradigm was implemented on the internet using samples of Mechanical 
Turk workers. 
However, this MN bias did not always emerge.  Loss of MN was observed when: (a) 
memory was assessed via a recognition task instead of via a free recall task; (b) people were 
asked to provide ratings or evaluations of the behaviors as they were encountered; (c) behavior 
encoding was accompanied by a classic cognitive load task. 
The studies also provided correlational evidence about many variables that did not seem 
to contribute to MN.  MN was not linked to the time it took for people to read the behaviors.  It 
was also not linked to perceptions of behavior valence/extremity, perceptions of the extent to 
which a behavior was important to perform, or the extent to which a behavior was perceived to 
be good or bad.  However, MN was linked to the extent to which important negative behaviors 
are perceived to be informative about a person’s personality.  
The picture of MN that is emerging, then, is that the cascade of mental processes that lead 
to MN seems to originate during behavior encoding.  Disrupting the way in which people usually 
think about the behaviors during behavior encoding causes loss of MN.  However, this disruption 
does not seemingly involve ignoring or not attending to threatening behaviors, as might be 
suggested by a perceptual defense view (e.g., Erdelyi, 1974).  What justifies this conclusion?  It 
took about as long for people to read self-threatening negative behaviors as it did for them to 
read self-promoting positive behaviors.  Moreover, MN was observed only in free recall, and not 
in recognition memory.  Both findings suggest that people do attend to, and store in memory, 
important negative self-relevant information.  
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Instead of inattention, the MN effect seems to be caused by the manner in which events 
are stored, which affects the ability to retrieve those events.  What justifies this conclusion?  MN 
occurs in free recall, but not in behavior recognition, implicating memory storage and search 
processes as a contributor to MN.  MN dissipates when a cognitive load is imposed during 
behavior processing. This effect occurs even when the load involves intensive processing of the 
behavior, as must occur when people provide various ratings of the behavior.  All of these 
findings point to the idea that important self-negative memories are attended to, but they are not 
elaborated on in a manner that links such behaviors to existing self-knowledge.  Hence, these 
negative memories are like “islands” in a sea of memories, with few bridges or ferries that can 
locate the memory during the kinds of memory search that occur during free recall. 
Looking to the Future of MN  
While the length of this list of contributions to the cognition of MN might seem 
impressive, much more remains to be done.  For example, memory assessment is not limited to 
recognition and free recall:  there are other methods of assessing memory.  These include cued 
recall tasks, remember/know judgments, and implicit memory tasks.  One way in which research 
into MN can be fruitfully expanded is to employ as many of these alternative memory 
assessments as possible.  Doing so is desirable because it would help to verify that MN emerges 
primarily in those tasks that depend on memory search. 
Additional contributions to an understanding of MN need to pursue additional details 
about the mental processes that lead to MN.  For example, we remain intrigued by finding that 
instructions to “include behaviors in the self” produces loss of MN (Pinter et al., 2011), and 
wonder exactly how those instructions alter the usual processing that occurs in the MN 
paradigm.  We also wonder whether MN reflects an inability to access important negative 
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behaviors during a memory search, or whether MN reflects an unwillingness to do so.  For 
example, what might happen if people were selectively rewarded for their performance in 
reporting the negative behaviors that they encountered?  An increase in performance suggests 
that MN might, in part, reflect a lack of motivation to find the important self-relevant 
information that might be stored in memory. 
The study of MN also needs to be expanded in other ways.  Sedikides and Green (2000) 
did an exemplary job of pretesting stimuli for use in the MN paradigm.  They did such a good 
job that subsequent studies of MN have almost exclusively used their stimuli (for an exception, 
see Zengel et al., 2015).  This selectivity obviously poses a risk to the generality of MN.  The 
theory of MN suggests that MN occurs in response to self-threatening stimuli.  However, 
evidence for MN has emerged in studies using primarily socially-oriented traits and behaviors 
implying those traits.  This social-trait focus ignores the fact that one fundamental idea in social 
psychology is that some behaviors imply traits related to competence.  It is unknown whether 
failure behaviors will provide the same degree of self-threat as behaviors that impugn 
trustworthiness or kindness.   
Indeed, there may be theoretical reasons to suspect that MN may differ for behaviors on 
the morality dimension and for behaviors on the competence dimension.  For example, reasoning 
from Leary’s sociometer idea (e.g., Leary, 2005), because traits such as unkindness or 
untrustworthy may be especially likely to lead to social rejection, any thoughts that one has about 
those traits might be especially threatening.  In comparison, behaviors related to incompetence 
may be less likely to lead to rejection, and so might be relatively less self-threatening.  On the 
other hand, some authors (see Wojciszke, 2005) have claimed that lack of competence poses an 
especially severe threat to the self.  Thus, from the Wojciske view, it may be that MN is 
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especially prevalent for behaviors that have self-incompetence implications.  More broadly, this 
analysis suggests that there is much to be gained from expanding the range of stimuli used in the 
mnemic neglect paradigm so that they can be matched to the many domains that explore bias in 
self-memory. 
MN in its Broader Context:  Considerations and Research Implications 
Moreover, we strongly encourage scholars to think about the phenomenon of mnemic 
neglect as it relates to the broader psychological context.  For example, the MN effect can be 
linked to the general study of bias in self-memory (see Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Zengel et al., 
2015).  In one example of such work, Skowronski (2011) considered two phenomena:  a 
positivity bias in autobiographical memory and the fading affect bias (positive memories tend to 
prompt greater emotion at recall than do negative memories; see Skowronski, Walker, 
Henderson, & Bond, 2014) in autobiographical memory.  He speculated that both effects might 
reflect the action of common processes designed to keep individuals positive so that they can 
continue to engage in and explore the world around them.  The mnemic neglect paradigm may fit 
with these phenomena, and because it is a laboratory paradigm, it is especially well-positioned to 
explore the positivity-promoting processes that cannot easily be explored in the non-
experimental autobiographical memory paradigms.  Moreover, the results from much of the 
research in these real-world memory domains are confusing and contradictory, in part because 
the studies use real-world stimuli.  The characteristics of those real-world stimuli are difficult to 
match across conditions.  The beauty of the MN paradigm is that people in different conditions 
are processing the same behavioral stimuli, but in the context of different referents.  This means 
that across referents, differences between stimuli cannot be the cause of the effects observed.  
The MN paradigm can ensure that observed effects are not caused by the many uninteresting 
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methodological confounds that emerge from the use of existing real-world stimuli, but instead 
emanate from the manner in which perceivers process stimulus events.   
Mnemic neglect research can also be linked two psychology’s long-standing interest in 
differences in self-thought and other-thought.  For example, considerable evidence suggests that 
people think differently about the self than they think about others (e.g., Beer & Watson, 2009), 
and one manifestation of this tendency is the self-serving bias in attribution (for an example, see 
Krusemark, Campbell, & Clementz, 2009).  The mnemic neglect effect can be viewed as another 
example of these kinds of differences in self-thought and other-thought.  Indeed, some real world 
autobiographical memory data suggests that people remember the best about themselves but the 
worst about others (see Thompson, et al., 1996).  In this context, one puzzle in the MN data is 
why important self-framed positive information is not better recalled than the same information 
that describes the fictional other, Chris.   
A final example of how mnemic neglect fits into the broad psychological context is the 
area of memory research exploring the self-reference effect (SRE):  linking information to the 
self tends to enhance memory for the information (for example, see Bentley, Greenaway, & 
Haslam, 2017).  Another puzzle in the mnemic neglect paradigm is that it generally does not 
seem to evince this self-reference effect, though the fact that MN increases with separation-
related thought does fit with the mechanisms thought to drive the SRE.   
These examples illustrate two ideas.  First, the phenomenon of mnemic neglect is not 
simply a niche phenomenon. Instead, it can be linked to, and can potentially inform, research in a 
large number of related areas.  The second idea illustrated by our contextual examples is that, 
when viewed in the context of other research areas, the data from the MN paradigm raises a large 
number of fascinating questions.  Thus, there is a lot of research that needs to be done.  We look 
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forward to the new insights to be derived about self-processing, other-processing, and the nature 
of memory that can be gleaned from MN research. 
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Footnotes 
1To be clear, two of the manuscript’s authors (BZ and JJS) have previously collaborated with Dr. 
Sedikides.  In addition, as we pursued the studies described in the present article, Dr. Sedikides 
generously provided stimuli and unpublished prestest results to us, and Dr. Green responded to 
many queries about the paradigm and about past results.  However, the work that we report in 
this article is entirely our own; neither Dr. Sedikides or Dr. Green directly contributed to the 
design, conduct, analysis, or writeup of any of the studies reported in the present article.   
2Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (http://www.MTurk.com) is an online labor market that is designed 
to pay people small amounts of money in exchange for completing tasks that are simple for 
humans but difficult for computers. Examples of these Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) range 
from choosing the best among several photographs of a storefront to writing product 
descriptions. More recently, however, MTurk has become popular within psychology and other 
social sciences as a means for online data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
MTurk is an especially attractive alternative to classical laboratory research, as it boasts a large, 
diverse workforce consisting of over 100,000 users from over 100 countries who complete tens 
of thousands of HITs daily (Pontin, 2007). 
3G*Power software (Version 3.1.2) was used to compute the required sample size given α (.05), 
power (.95), and variable effect sizes. Given the extant mnemic neglect literature, coupled with 
results from the Pilot Study, effect sizes for Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence 
interactions were expected to be large (effect size f = .5).  Assuming small to moderate effect 
sizes for the 4-way interactions proposed in this dissertation (e.g., Cognitive Load ×Referent × 
Trait Type × Behavior Valence), hypothetical required sample sizes are shown in Table 11. 
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Required Sample Sizes for Proposed Dissertation Experiments  
Effect Size f Total Sample Size 
.20 132 
.25 86 
.30 60 
 
Based upon this power analysis, a sample size of at least 60 valid participants was deemed 
sufficient to adequately examine each of the hypothesized 4-way interactions.  Data was deemed 
invalid if no behaviors were recalled or three or more intrusions were included.  We aimed to 
oversample to ensure that the number of valid participants was sufficient. 
4As is typical (e.g., Ratcliff, 1993), reading times were positively skewed and leptokurtotic (M = 
4421; SD = 2876; skewness = 4.11; kurtosis = 39.38).  We applied many of the standard data 
analysis techniques that are often used in response to data that exhibits these characteristics.  For 
example, conclusions drawn from analyses that entered log transformed reading times into the 
analysis to minimize these problems did not differ from the conclusions of the analyses reported 
in the text.  Similar results also came from other data analyses, including analyses that removed 
outliers from the analysis and an analysis that used a dependent measure that controlled for 
sentence length by dividing the reading time for each sentence by the number of syllables in each 
sentence.  Thus, for clarity and simplicity, all analyses described herein use raw reading time 
data. 
5Our interpretation of the Study 3 data is also supported by results of analyses from data only in 
the no load condition.  These analyses yielded a Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence interaction, F(1, 34) = 4.04, p = .052, ηp2 = .106.  Decomposing this interaction showed 
that the Behavior Referent × Behavior Valence interaction did not emerge for peripheral trait-
implicative behaviors (p = .525).  However, this interaction did emerge for central trait-
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implicative behaviors, F(1, 34) = 4.79, p = .036, ηp2 = .123.  Further decomposition showed that 
there was no significant difference in recall for self-referent compared to Chris-referent positive 
central trait-implicative behaviors (p = .244).  However, self-referent negative central trait-
implicative behaviors were recalled less well than Chris-referent negative central trait-
implicative behaviors, F(1, 34) = 3.11, p = .087, ηp2 = .084.  
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Table 1 
 
Proportion of Behaviors Recalled (SD) for the Recall Delay × Behavior Referent × Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence Interaction (Excluding Intrusions; N = 129) in Study 1 
 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
Behavior Referent Positive Negative Positive Negative 
No Recall Delay     
     Self .36 (.20) .25 (.23) .16 (.21) .13 (.19) 
     Chris .38 (.16) .39 (.24) .17 (.14) .17 (.13) 
48-Hour Recall Delay     
     Self .22 (.16) .08 (.15) .05 (.12) .06 (.08) 
     Chris .18 (.14) .20 (.11) .07 (.09) .10 (.16) 
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Table 2 
 
Behavior Recognition Accuracy (SD) for the Recall Delay × Behavior Referent × Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence Interaction (Excluding Intrusions; N = 129) in Study 1 
 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
Behavior Referent Positive Negative Positive Negative 
No Recall Delay     
     Self .79 (.17) .79 (.14) .76 (.14) .78 (.15) 
     Chris .85 (.16) .85 (.15) .77 (.16) .82 (.14) 
48-Hour Recall Delay     
     Self .69 (.16) .71 (.15) .67 (.15) .70 (.15) 
     Chris .78 (.11) .76 (.12) .73 (.10) .71 (.12) 
Note. Behavior recognition accuracy values (δ) were derived by converting mean hits and mean 
correct rejections into proportions, and then by averaging the result, for each set of eight 
behaviors defined by the interaction of Trait Type and Behavior Valence. 
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Table 3 
 
Proportion of Behaviors Recalled (SD) for the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence Interaction (Excluding Intrusions; N = 89) in Study 2 
 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Behavior Referent 
     Self .41 (.15) .21 (.14) .11 (.11) .13 (.13) 
     Chris .40 (.17) .39 (.18) .20 (.19) .17 (.14) 
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Table 4 
 
Behavior Reading Time Means (SD) for the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × 
Behavior Valence Interaction (Excluding Intrusions; N = 89) in Study 2 
 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Behavior Referent 
     Self 4605 (1722) 4081 (1383) 4612 (1747) 4517 (1600) 
     Chris 4681 (1466) 3978 (1276) 4476 (1373) 4410 (1356) 
Note. Means and standard deviations are reported in milliseconds. 
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Table 5 
 
Proportion of Behaviors Recalled (SD) for the Cognitive Load × Behavior Referent × Trait 
Type × Behavior Valence Interaction (Excluding Intrusions; N = 67) in Study 3 
 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
Behavior Referent Positive Negative Positive Negative 
No Cognitive Load     
     Self .45 (.15) .29 (.18) .13 (.14) .12 (.13) 
     Chris .39 (.15) .40 (.19) .20 (.14) .16 (.14) 
Cognitive Load     
     Self .15 (.11) .26 (.19) .09 (.11) .06 (.08) 
     Chris .23 (.19) .18 (.12) .06 (.10) .09 (.08) 
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Table 6 
 
Proportion of Behaviors Recalled (SD) for the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior 
Valence Interaction in Study 4 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
Behavior Referent Positive Negative Positive Negative 
MN Replication      
     Self .24 (.17) .16 (.16) .08 (.12) .05 (.08) 
     Chris .27 (.16) .25 (.17) .13 (.15) .08 (.10) 
Behavior Rating     
     Self .30 (.21) .23 (.19) .11 (.13) .08 (.12) 
     Chris .31 (.19) .23 (.15) .11 (.14) .13 (.14) 
Evaluation Ratings     
     Self .28 (.17) .25 (.17) .11 (.15) .09 (.12) 
     Chris .33 (.17) .24 (.18) .12 (.14) .08 (.10) 
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Table 7     
Valence Ratings (SD), Importance Ratings (SD), Informativeness Ratings (SD),and 
Evaluation Ratings (SD) for the Behavior Referent × Trait Type × Behavior Valence 
Interaction in Study 4 
 Central Behaviors Peripheral Behaviors 
Behavior Referent Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Valence/Extremity 
Rating 
    
     Self 2.03 (0.60) -2.28 (0.60) 0.66 (0.66) -1.44 (0.56) 
     Chris 2.08 (0.66) -2.23 (0.49) 0.84 (0.74) -1.37 (0.53) 
     
Importance Rating     
     Self 1.65 (0.67) -1.87 (0.90) 0.50 (0.65) -1.21 (0.68) 
     Chris 1.71 (0.70) -1.59 (1.11) 0.65 (0.61) -1.00 (0.86) 
     
Informativeness 
Rating 
    
     Self 1.69 (0.70) 1.18 (1.52) 0.90 (0.77) 0.97 (1.08) 
     Chris 1.72 (0.77) 1.41 (1.29) 1.07 (0.69) 0.96 (0.99) 
     
Evaluation Rating     
     Self 2.12 (0.62) -2.13 (0.74) 0.74 (0.63) -1.20 (0.68) 
     Chris 2.26 (0.54) -2.22 (0.50) 0.92 (0.62) -1.22 (0.56) 
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Figure 1. Depiction of cognitive load manipulation in Study 3. 
 
Remember the 
following number: 
 
187359 
“X would borrow 
other people’s 
belongings without 
their knowledge.” 
 
Please type in the 
number you were 
asked to remember: 
 
__________ 
 
5 seconds 
pass 
8 seconds 
pass 
Computer Screen 1 Computer Screen 2 Computer Screen 3 
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ONLINE MATERIAL 
 
Study 4: Significant results of ratings analyses 
Valence/Extremity Rating: 
Trait Type: F(1, 177) = 67.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .275  
Central: M = -0.10, SD = 0.29 
Peripheral: M = -0.32, SD = 0.38 
Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 2257.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .927  
Positive: M = 1.41, SD = 0.59 
Negative: M = -1.83, SD = 0.46 
Behavior Referent: F(1, 177) = 4.85, p = .029, ηp2 = .027  
Self: M = -0.26, SD = 0.24 
Chris: M = -0.17, SD = 0.30 
Trait Type × Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 946.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .842  
Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 178) = 3185.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .947 
Positive: M = 2.06, SD = 0.63 
Negative: M = -2.25, SD = 0.54 
Peripheral – Behavior Valence: F(1, 178) = 812.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .820 
Positive: M = 0.76, SD = 0.71 
Negative: M = -1.40, SD = 0.54 
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Importance Rating: 
Trait Type: F(1, 177) = 63.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .265 
Central: M = -0.02, SD = 0.52 
Peripheral: M = -0.26, SD = 0.47 
Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 930.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .840  
Positive: M = 1.13, SD = 0.56 
Negative: M = -1.41, SD = 0.84 
Behavior Referent: F(1, 177) = 6.74, p = .010, ηp2 = .037  
Self: M = -0.23, SD = 0.35 
Chris: M = -0.06, SD = 0.51 
Trait Type × Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 436.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .712  
Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 178) = 1058.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .856 
Positive: M = 1.69, SD = 0.68 
Negative: M = -1.72, SD = 1.02 
Peripheral – Behavior Valence: F(1, 178) = 447.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .715 
Positive: M = 0.58, SD = 0.63 
Negative: M = -1.09, SD = 0.79 
 
Informativeness Rating: 
Trait Type: F(1, 177) = 207.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .539 
Central: M = 1.51, SD = 0.89 
Peripheral: M = 0.98, SD = 0.80 
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Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 9.20, p = .003, ηp2 = .049 
Positive: M = 1.35, SD = 0.65 
Negative: M = 1.13, SD = 1.17 
Trait Type × Behavior Valence: F(1, 177) = 23.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .116 
Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 178) = 16.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .084 
Central – Positive: M = 1.71, SD = 0.74 
Central – Negative: M = 1.30, SD = 1.40 
Peripheral – Behavior Valence: p = .598 
Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent: F(1, 177) = 5.37, p = .022,  
ηp
2
 = .029 
Chris – Trait Type × Behavior Valence: F(1, 96) = 4.00, p = .048, ηp2 = .040 
Chris & Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 96) = 5.81, p = .018, ηp2 = .057 
Positive: M = 1.72, SD = 0.77 
Negative: M = 1.41, SD = 1.29 
Chris & Peripheral – Behavior Valence: p = .150 
Self – Trait Type × Behavior Valence: F(1, 81) = 19.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .197 
Self & Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 81) = 10.92, p = .001, ηp2 = .119 
Positive: M = 1.69, SD = 0.70  
Negative: M = 1.18, SD = 1.52 
Self & Peripheral – Behavior Valence: p = .439 
 
 
 
THE WAXING AND WANING OF MNEMIC NEGLECT                                                                    68 
 
 
 
Evaluation Ratings: 
Trait Type: F(1, 189) = 55.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .227 
Central: M = 0.01, SD = 0.24 
Peripheral: M = -0.19, SD = 0.37 
Trait Valence: F(1, 189) = 2115.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .918  
Positive: M = 1.52, SD = 0.51  
Negative: M = -1.69, SD = 0.58 
Trait Type × Trait Valence: F(1, 189) = 1353.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .877  
Central – Behavior Valence: F(1, 190) = 2994.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .940 
Positive: M = 2.19, SD = 0.58 
Negative: M = -2.18, SD = 0.62 
Peripheral – Behavior Valence: F(1, 190) = 789.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .806 
Positive: M = 0.84, SD = 0.63 
Negative: M = -1.21, SD = 0.62 
 
